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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v,

:

DIANE MARIE NELSON,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 970163-CA
Priority No. 2

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal by a criminal defendant from judgment
of conviction entered December 13, 1996 for Aggravated Robbery, a
first degree felony.

This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (j) (1996) .

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE I:

Did the trial court commit reversible error by

failing to make findings of fact or conclusions of law on
Appellant's motion to suppress the eyewitness identification on
the ground that it was unreliable pursuant to Article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

If factual issues are presented to

and must be resolved by the trial court, but no findings of fact
appear in the record, the reviewing court will "assume that the
trier of facts found them in accord with its decision, and [will]
affirm the decision if from the evidence it would be reasonable
to find facts to support it."
1224 (Utah 1997).

State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219,

If this assumption is unreasonable, a remand

for a new trial is required.

Id.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

This issue was preserved at

R. 17, 161-69.
ISSUE II;

Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a

conviction of aggravated robbery?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

This Court will reverse a criminal

case for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict, is "sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE:

This issue was preserved at

R. 374-375.

TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES AND RULES
The text of the following constitutional provisions,
statutes and rules is included in Addendum A of this Brief:
The Due Process Clause to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution;
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995);
Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On November 4, 1996, Diane Nelson ("Appellant" or
"Diane") was convicted by a jury of Aggravated Robbery, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (Supp.
2

1996) and Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third District
Court, Salt Lake Department, Division I, for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Leslie Lewis presiding.
was entered December 13, 1996.

Judgment

On December 26, 1996, a Notice of

Appeal was filed in the Utah Supreme Court.

On February 24,

1997, the Utah Supreme Court poured over the case to this Court
for disposition.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 1, 1996, Amy Brown ("Mrs. Brown") had been
driving around Salt Lake City to "cool off" after having a
dispute with her roommates.

R. 290, 309-10.

At approximately

9:50 to 10:00 p.m., she went back to her apartment at 263 Delmar
Court.

Delmar runs northbound from 300 South and is located

about a block from Pioneer Park between 300 West and 200 West.
R. 289, 335. Mrs. Brown parked her truck a few feet from her
apartment and began to walk home.
pitch black.

R. 311.

It was dark, but not

R. 311, 294, 328. Though there are street lights

in that area, only one or two lights were lit.

R. 294. Where

Mrs. Brown lives there are garages on one side and apartments on
the other, and no lighting.

R. 294. Because the neighborhood is

a high crime area, and it was after dark, Mrs. Brown was trying
to get from her truck to the apartment as quickly as she could.
R. 325-26.

As she walked, she saw two men and a woman standing

by a dumpster.

R. 312. Mrs. Brown ignored the people as she

continued walking to her apartment.
3

R. 136. Mrs. Brown heard

the woman say, "Nice shoes."

R. 314.

Mrs. Brown did not stop,

but ignored the woman and continued walking.

R. 313, 314, 325.

Mrs. Brown said the woman then turned to one of the men and said,
"I like her shoes."

R. 314.

continued walking.

R. 314.

Mrs. Brown ignored her and
Mrs. Brown looked out of the corner

of her eye at the people as she walked by.

R. 326.

She paid

more attention to the two men than she did the woman.

R. 323.

Mrs. Brown heard the woman say the man's name and then say, "Get
them for me."

R. 314.

she was terrified.

Mrs. Brown testified that at that point

The man, who was about three feet from the

woman and about four feet from Mrs. Brown, pulled a knife from
behind his back and pointed it toward her.

R. 314-15.

At that

point, Mrs. Brown's attention was focused on the man with the
knife and the weapon.

R. 327.

At some point, the man told

Mrs. Brown to "give her the shoes."

R. 329.

running away from the people to her apartment.
did not look back.
her up the alley.

R. 328.

Mrs. Brown began
R. 316, 328.

She

The man followed but did not chase

Instead, he turned toward Pioneer Park.

R. 318.
The woman did not say anything after the man came near
Mrs. Brown with the knife.

R. 317.

The woman did not have the

knife, touch the knife, or hand a knife to anyone.
not say anything about the knife.
chase her.

R. 328.

R. 327-28.

The woman did

The woman did not

She did not say anything else to the man, or

encourage or assist him in any other way.

R. 329.

Mrs. Brown got to her apartment, she was hysterical.
4

By the time
R. 291,

298, 319, 339, 344.

Mrs. Brown called the police.

police arrived about 15 to 20 minutes later.

R. 291.

The

R. 296-97.

According to Officer DeGraw's ("DeGraw") report,
Mrs. Brown described the woman as black, with curly black hair,
five feet, six inches tall.

R. 348-49.

Despite Mrs. Brown's

belief that she had no difficulty seeing, she gave DeGraw no
description of the woman's shirt, pants, shoes, body shape,
weight, length of hair, or eye color.

R. 332-33, 350.

After

getting a description of the people from Mrs. Brown, the police
left to search the area.

R. 297.

About 3 0 to 4 0 minutes after Mrs. Brown made the call,
the police returned asking Mrs. Brown to identify a woman.
R. 298, 302, 319-20.

Mrs. Brown was so hysterical it took her

husband a couple of minutes to coax her off the couch and outside
with the police.
R. 331.

R. 298.

By then, it was completely dark.

Mrs. Brown said the police took her down the front alley

where she saw Appellant, Diane Nelson, handcuffed by a police
car.

R. 321.

with her.
handcuffed.

Mrs. Brown's husband, Ray Brown ("Brown"), was

R. 302-303.
R. 3 03.

Brown also testified that Diane was
No one else was presented for

identification other than Diane.
was standing by Diane.
in Diane's face.
away.

R. 354.

R. 354.

R. 298.

R. 304, 354.

Officer Boelter

The police shined a flashlight

Mrs. Brown was about fifteen feet

Mrs. Brown became "hysterical," telling the

police that Diane was the woman by the dumpster.

R. 298.

Diane had been taken into custody as she walked out of an
5

alley east of Delmar Court, just north of the dumpster.

She was

very emotional, stating that she had not done anything.

R. 343.

DeGraw testified that Diane told him, "Maybe Cody or Brad did
something, but I didn't do anything."
weapon.

R. 345.

She had no

R. 351.
Mrs. Brown testified that she ignored the people by the

dumpster throughout most of the incident.
327.

R. 313, 314, 324, 325,

Mrs. Brown believed the entire incident lasted less than

thirty seconds.

R. 328.

At trial, Mrs. Brown testified that the

woman by the dumpster was "nicely dressed" and "not wearing
shorts or anything like that" but had "pants and a shirt on.

At

the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Brown testified that she could not
recall what the woman was wearing, only what one of the men was
wearing because she was looking more closely at the men than she
was the woman.

R. 323.

Mrs. Brown testified that the woman by

the dumpster was slightly taller than herself.

R. 329.

Mrs. Brown told the police the woman was five-feet six-inches
tall.

R. 160-61.

Diane is five-feet two-inches tall, two inches

shorter than Mrs. Brown.

R. 349.

Mrs. Brown testified that the

knife was a large hunting knife, eighteen inches to two feet
long.

R. 315.

In Officer DeGraw7s report, Mrs. Brown described

the knife as a large pocket knife.

R. 347.

Delmar Court is

close to Pioneer Park, a well known high crime area.

R. 335.

Many low income and homeless people frequent the area, milling
about and congregating on street corners.
near the Broadway and LeFrance Hotels.
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Delmar Court is also

There are a number of

low-income, African American and Hispanic people living in those
hotels.

R. 300-301, 325-26, 351-52.
Dr. Dodd, a professor of psychology with the University

of Utah and expert in eyewitness identification, testified on
behalf of Diane.

Dr. Dodd testified that identification involves

three stages — acquisition, retention and recall.

R. 385.

Because attention is selective, what a person notices and
remembers may be inaccurate.
critical stage.

R. 386.

R. 384. Acquisition is the most

Factors that affect acquisition include

the ability to perceive and whether the person is paying
attention.

R. 3 86.

People who are anxious or stressed are

likely to have poorer abilities to acquire information.

R. 3 89.

The greater the stress, the poorer the performance in all
cognitive activities.

R. 389.

The longer the time for

observation, the more likely the witness will remember what she
has seen.

R. 390.

It takes a considerable amount of time to

take up enough information to remember a new face.

R. 402.

It

is very unlikely that 10 to 15 seconds of observation is
sufficient to remember a new face.

R. 403. Witnesses, however,

tend to remember fast-moving, stressful events as taking longer
than they in fact did, typically exaggerating the duration of
time by anywhere from two to four times.

R. 390-91.

Dr. Dodd

testified that walking past a dumpster was a very brief period of
time in which to see three faces.

391-92.

If the witness

focuses on one person, she is less likely to focus on the others.
R. 391-92.

If a weapon is involved, the witness is more likely
7

to focus on the weapon and not the perpetrator's face.
R. 406-07.
The reliability of an eyewitness identification is not
measured by the honesty or level of certainty of the witness.
R. 388. While height estimates are not typically very accurate,
it is easy for most witnesses to determine if the person was
taller or shorter than themselves.

R. 392.

identifications are more unreliable.

Cross-racial

R. 3 93.

Retrieval can be influenced by suggestions one picks up
from the environment.

R. 386.

Suggestions can be in the form of

a question that suggests a new piece of information about events
or a characteristic of the face of the person.

R. 3 94.

A

witness's memory is especially vulnerable to suggestion if the
original acquisition is weak.

R. 395. Any suggestion by law

enforcement that they have the right person is likely to lead to
retrieval of misinformation.

R. 396.

Showups are by nature

extremely suggestive because they convey a strong suggestion that
the police have the right person.

R. 3 97.

Dr. Dodd testified

that there are many experts, British and American, who maintain
that showups are such suggestive procedures that they should not
be used at all.

R. 413.

The witness is more likely to be

influenced by suggestion when the witness is motivated to see
that the wrongdoer is apprehended.

R. 3 97.

The fact that the witness did not identify another
individual in a subsequent showup is not significant without
knowing how similar the individual was to the original
8

participant.

R. 411.

Dr. Dodd testified that given all the factors of this
case, the brief time period for observation, the darkness,
stress, and cross-racial identification, among others, there was
a "strong likelihood that the person who saw the perpetrator
could not identify them later, even several minutes later."
R. 398.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Prior to trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the
eyewitness identification on the grounds that the showup was
prejudicially suggestive and the identification unreliable under
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

The trial court

refused to address the reliability of the identification under
the factors laid out in State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah
1991), but instead let the issue go the jury.

The trial court's

failure to make the necessary legal and factual findings to
determine as a constitutional matter whether the identification
is sufficiently reliable under Article I, section 7 constitutes
reversible error.

There are unresolved factual conflicts and

inconsistencies in the evidence material to the admissibility of
the eyewitness identification.

Absent the eyewitness

identification, the State has no case against Appellant.

The

remedy for the trial court's failure to make the necessary legal
and factual determinations is a remand for a new trial.
The State presented insufficient evidence to support a
9

conviction of Aggravated Robbery.

In order to convict Appellant

as an accomplice to Aggravated Robbery, the State must prove that
she knew that the principal would use a dangerous weapon in the
commission of the offense.

The State failed to present any

evidence to support this conclusion.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR BY FAILING TO MAKE ANY FACTUAL OR LEGAL
DETERMINATIONS REGARDING APPELLANTS MOTION TO
SUPPRESS THE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION.
When the reliability of an eyewitness identification is
challenged under Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution,
the trial court must determine whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the identification was reliable.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 (Utah 1991).

State v.

The trial court's

failure to make a preliminary determination of the reliability of
an eyewitness identification is reversible error and a new trial
is warranted.

Id. at 787-88.1

It has long been recognized that the reliability of an
eyewitness identification can be affected by a range of factors
such as the race of the individuals or suggestive identification
procedures.

State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489 (Utah 1986).

1

.
Appellant also challenges the admissibility of the
eyewitness identification under the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution. Because the analysis under Article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution is "as stringent as, if not more
stringent than, the federal analysis" required under Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972),
Appellant has focused his analysis on the state constitutional
claim. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784.
10

Research has shown popular notions regarding eyewitness
identifications are often untrue.

For example, the confidence of

the individual making the identification is not a reliable
indicator of the accuracy of his or her memory.

Xd.

It is a

common misconception that a victim of a crime will have a greater
ability to recall details because of the significance of the
event.

But research has long shown that when people are under

stress, their ability to acquire information is diminished.

Id.

at 488-89, R. 389.
Despite the acknowledged frailties of eyewitness
identifications, jurors still give such testimony a great deal of
weight.

Long, 721 P.2d at 490.

One study involving a simulated

criminal trial showed that even when "presented with an
eyewitness who was quite thoroughly discredited by counsel," 68%
of the jurors still voted to convict.

.Id.

The Utah Supreme

Court, in recognition of the fact that the "annals of criminal
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification," has
fashioned a rigorous analysis testing the reliability of
eyewitness identifications under Article I, section 7 of the Utah
Constitution.

Id. at 491 (quoting United States v. Wade, 388

U.S. 218, 228, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967).
In fashioning this analysis under the Utah Constitution,
the Court stated:
Of central importance is the burden that rests on
the prosecution and the distinction between the
role of the judge, as the arbiter of the
constitutional admissibility of an
identification, and the role of the jury, as the
ultimate finder of fact. A failure to keep this
11

burden and this distinction in mind can fatally
flaw any conviction obtained through the
admissibility of any eyewitness identification.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 778.

The burden is on the prosecution to

demonstrate the admissibility of the eyewitness identification.
Id.

"The defendant then is entitled to a determination by the

court of the evidence's constitutional admissibility."
778.

.Id. at

In making that determination, the trial court must resolve

certain factual issues.

Many of those same factual issues will

also be addressed by the jury when it determines the credibility
of the evidence, if admitted.

Jd.

For example, the court will

have to resolve certain factual matters such as whether the
witness had a sufficient opportunity to perceive the perpetrator
in order to determine whether, as a constitutional matter, the
evidence meets the threshold requirement of reliability.

If the

evidence is admitted, the jury will also have to decide the issue
again in determining the weight to give the evidence.

Id.

Potential for role confusion and for erosion of
constitutional guarantees inheres in this overlap
of responsibility of judge and jury to determine
the same issue. Because the jury is not bound by
the judge's preliminary factual determination
made in ruling on admissibility, the trial court
may be tempted to abdicate its charge as
gatekeeper to carefully scrutinize proffered
evidence for constitutional defects and may
simply admit the evidence, leaving all questions
pertinent to its reliability to the jury. But
courts cannot properly sidestep their
responsibility to perform the required
constitutional admissibility analysis. To do so
would leave protection of constitutional rights
to the whim of a jury and would abandon the
courts' responsibility to apply the law. The
danger of such an abdication of responsibility is
particularly serious where the admissibility of
an eyewitness identification is concerned because
12

of the probability that such evidence even though
thoroughly discredited has a powerful effect on a
jury.
Id. at 778-79 (citations omitted).
The trial court, in this case, succumbed to the very
temptation of which Ramirez gives warning.

The court abdicated

its role as the gatekeeper and guardian of constitutional
protections and refused without review of the facts to fairly
determine the necessary issues.

Prior to trial, defense counsel

filed a motion to suppress the eyewitness identification in this
case on the grounds that it was not reliable under Article I,
section 7 of the Utah Constitution.

R. 17.

At the motion to

suppress hearing, defense counsel indicated that it was his
understanding that the State intended to submit the preliminary
hearing transcript.

Defense counsel indicated that he intended

to also rely on portions of the preliminary hearing transcript
and the testimony of Dr. Dodd.

R. 161-62.

The trial court then

stated:
And frankly, 111 be honest with you [defense
counsel], unless there's something highly
unusual, here, it's an issue of fact as to
whether or not the eye witness is reliable.
Dr. Dodd can certainly say what he thinks, but
he's not the finder of fact, the jury would be.
So what I'd be inclined to do is let it go to the
jury, and not suppress the identification, give
the Long instruction, let Dr. Dodd testify, let
the state call an expert if they wish to.
R. 162-63.
After some discussion about discovery and notice of the
use of an expert witness, the court stated:

13

Assuming foundation can be laid consistent with
the curriculum vitae, I would allow the witness
to be called at trial to testify to the general
unreliability, or the factors that lead to
unreliability in eyewitness testimony. Given my
ruling, I don't think you can gain anything by
putting him on, [defense counsel]. I guess [the
State] has the option of calling him if he wishes
to.
R. 167-68.
Defense counsel indicated that the purpose of his motion
to suppress was to ask the trial court to determine as a matter
of law, prior to trial, the reliability of the identification.
R. 168.

Counsel then made a proffer as to some of the subject

matters Dr. Dodd would have testified about.

The court responded

by denying the motion without having heard any evidence, or
making any findings of fact, instead relying on the jury to
determine the reliability of the identification.
Trial Court: Right. And again, either side can
argue this with or without testimony. But absent
any further information that persuades me, I'm
inclined to allow the identification to stand, to
deny the motion to suppress, but to instruct the
jury fully on the issue of eyewitness
identification pursuant to Long, to allow the
State to call a witness on eyewitness
identification of their own if they wish to.
R. 169.
It is clear from the above statements that the trial
court erroneously believed that the reliability of the eyewitness
identification was an issue of fact for the jury, and not for the
trial court.

The State never submitted the preliminary hearing

transcripts or any other evidence in support of its burden of
establishing the reliability of the identification.
14

The court

apparently believed that instructing the jury on the factors
articulated in Long for assessing the reliability of an
eyewitness identification was sufficient to protect Appellant's
due process rights under the Utah Constitution.
was incorrect.

This assumption

Ramirez requires the trial court apply the

factors articulated in Loner to determine as a constitutional
matter whether the identification is sufficiently reliable.

The

Long factors are as follows:
(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree
of attention to the actor at the time of the
event; (3) the witness's capacity to observe the
event, including his or her physical and mental
acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification
was made spontaneously and remained consistent
thereafter, or whether it was the product of
suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being
observed and the likelihood that the witness
would perceive, remember and relate it correctly.
This last area includes such factors as whether
the event was an ordinary one in the mind of the
observer during the time it was observed, and
whether the race of the actor was the same as the
observer's.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 781 (quoting Long, 721 P.2d at 493).

The

trial court made no attempt to apply the factors articulated in
Ramirez to the facts of this case, or resolve any factual
disputes.
Generally, when factual issues must be resolved by the
trial court but no findings of fact can be found in the record,
the reviewing court will assume that the trial court found them
in accord with its decision, and will affirm the decision if the
evidence reasonably supports the court's ruling.
cases where that assumption is inappropriate.
15

There are some

State v.

Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1224-25 (Utah 1997); Ramirez, 817 P.2d
at 787.

A remand for a new trial is required in cases where

there are conflicts in the evidence critical to the issues
raised.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787.
In Ramirez, the trial court did not rule on a pretrial

motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of an illegal
seizure, but refrained from passing on the issue letting the
evidence go to the jury instead.

R. Xd. at 786.

included the eyewitness identification.

Ld.

That evidence

The Ramirez court

held, "[T]he trial court bears the responsibility to resolve
preliminary constitutional issues as to the admissibility of
evidence, and it cannot abdicate this responsibility by de facto
leaving the question to the jury."

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787.

The court also noted that Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure required the court make findings of fact on
the record.

Id. at 787.

Because there were conflicts in the

evidence material to the suppression motion, the Ramirez court
could not assume that findings had been made.

id. at 788.

Most

troubling to the court was the fact that these conflicts existed
among the State's own witnesses.

Id. at 787.

One critical

factual issue left unanswered by the trial court was whether
Ramirez was handcuffed prior to the officers receiving
information about the crime.

Id. at 787.

Having determined that the trial court had not committed
a "mere technical oversight," but had failed to "address the
factual questions and to make the legal determinations that were
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a prerequisite to the admission of the eyewitness identification
essential to the conviction," the court turned to the issue of an
appropriate remedy.

Id. at 788. The court vacated the

conviction and remanded for a new trial before a different judge.
The Ramirez court reasoned:
To asked the trial court to address the
admissibility question now would be to tempt it
to reach a post hoc rationalization for the
admission of this pivotal evidence. Such a mode
of proceeding holds too much potential for abuse.
The only fair way to proceed is to vacate
defendant's conviction and remand the matter for
retrial. This will permit a trial judge to
address properly the constitutional admissibility
question and enter appropriate findings and
conclusions.
Id. at 789.
It would be unreasonable to assume that the court in this
case made any factual findings in light of the fact that the
court indicated from the outset its belief that the reliability
of the identification was a matter for the jury.

Subsequently,

the court never reviewed any of facts of the case and indicated a
marked unwillingness to do so.

The trial court failed to address

the issues presented to it in any meaningful way.

This is not

simply a case where the court made a reasoned ruling but failed
to make specific findings of fact to support it.

In this case,

the trial court never considered the critical issue of whether
the identification met the threshold level of reliability
required by Article I, section 7.
Indeed, as in Ramirez, a review of the trial transcripts
reveal a number of conflicts in the evidence critical to the
17

determination of the admissibility of the identification.

These

factual issues are central to the issue of the reliability of the
identification.

For example, it was unclear how dark it was at

the time of the incident or how well lit the area was.
Mrs. Brown testified that at 9:50 or 10:00 p.m., it was almost
dark, but that there were street lights along the sidewalk.
R. 311-12.

Her husband testified that it was "pretty dark," but

that some of the street lights were out so that only one or two
lights were working.

R. 294.

lights were near the dumpsters.

It was unclear whether the working
Mrs. Brown's husband also

testified that the dumpsters were located on the alley near Third
South.

R. 295.

He indicated that in the area near Third South

there is no lighting.

R. 294-95.

it is not a well lit area.

Officer DeGraw testified that

R. 338.

Perhaps the most troubling

conflict in the evidence left unresolved by the trial court
involves the issue of whether Appellant was handcuffed during the
showup.

Officer DeGraw claimed that Appellant was not handcuffed

during the showup.

R. 354.

However, his testimony was

contradicted by the State's other witnesses.
testified that Appellant was handcuffed.

Mrs. Brown

R. 321.

Her husband

also testified that Appellant was handcuffed during the showup.
R. 303.

The resolution of this factual issue is critical to a

fair and reasoned determination of the reliability of the
eyewitness identification.
In Ramirez, the defendant was handcuffed to a fence, he
was the only suspect presented for identification, lights were
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shined in his face, and he was surrounded by police.
777.

817 P.2d at

The court stated that the showup was blatantly suggestive.

Likewise, in State v. Perry, 899 P.2d 1232, 1234 (Utah Ct. App.
1995), the defendant was standing on the porch of his apartment.
He, too, was alone save for several police officers standing near
him while the patrol car lights were shined into his face.

The

court held that the trial court's finding that the showup was not
blatantly suggestive was clearly erroneous.

Id. at 1238.

The showup in this case is likewise prejudicially
suggestive.

Appellant was the only suspect presented for

identification.

R. 304, 354.

It was dark.

R. 331.

She was

standing by a police car with Officer Boelter by her side.
R. 321, 354.
R. 298.

The police shined a flashlight in her face.

If Appellant were also handcuffed, the prejudicial

impact of this already blatantly suggestive showup is heightened.
Most people associate the use of handcuffs with an arrest.

And

most people would assume that the police would arrest someone
only if they believed he or she had committed a crime.

Most

importantly, people tend to have confidence in the police and
their judgment in such matters, so the suggestion that the right
person has been found is even stronger.

If Appellant were

handcuffed, the clear implication would be that the police had
already arrested her because they believed they had the right
person.

Given the fact that the circumstances surrounding the

incident call into serious question the reliability of the
identification, this cannot be ignored and left unresolved.
19

Looking at the evidence presented at trial, the record does not
clearly support a ruling that the eyewitness identification was
reliable.

The incident took place in the length of time it took

Mrs. Brown to walk past the three people by the dumpster.

She

was trying to get to her apartment as quickly as possible.
R. 325-26.

Mrs. Brown estimated the incident lasted less than

thirty seconds.

R. 328.

But, it must be remembered that

according to Dr. Dodd, people tend to exaggerate the duration of
a stressful and fast moving event.

R. 3 90-91.

Dr. Dodd

testified that it was very unlikely that 10 to 15 seconds of
observation was sufficient to remember a new face.
Mrs. Brown

testified no less

than

R. 403.

five times at trial that she

ignored the people by the dumpster as she walked by them.
R. 313, 314, 324-25, 327.

Mrs. Brown admitted that she paid more

attention to the two men than she did the woman.

R. 323.

She

testified that she looked out of the corner of her eye at the
people as she walked by them.

R. 326.

At the point in time that

the man pulled out the knife, her focus was on him and the
weapon, not the woman.
back.

R. 327.

Then she ran and did not look

R. 328.
The lighting was poor at best.

R. 294, 311, 325-26, 328.

Mrs. Brown was completely hysterical after the incident and
during the showup.

R. 291, 298, 319, 339, 344.

Though

Mrs. Brown testified that she identified Appellant at the showup
based on her face and clothing, Mrs. Brown apparently gave
Officer DeGraw no description of the woman's clothing immediately
20

after the incident.

R. 321, 332-33. Mrs. Brown admitted that at

the preliminary hearing, she stated that she could not remember
what the woman was wearing because she paid more attention to the
two men.

R. 323. Mrs. Brown testified at trial that the woman

was taller than herself.

R. 329.

She told Officer DeGraw

immediately after the incident that the woman was five-foot sixinches tall, two inches taller than herself.

R.

348-49.

Appellant is two inches shorter than Mrs. Brown.

R. 349.

The

most troubling aspect of the identification in this case is the
fact that the eyewitness is Caucasian and Appellant is African
American.

R. 393.

It is a well documented fact that cross-

racial identifications tend to be less accurate.
at 489.

Long, 721 P.2d

In conjunction with the blatantly suggestive showup

procedure, the reliability of the identification in this case is
highly questionable even if Appellant were not handcuffed during
the showup.

If she were handcuffed, the prejudicial impact of

the showup undermines the reliability of the identification even
further.
This case is distinguishable from other cases where
despite a suggestive showup, the court has found that under the
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable.
Ramirez is the leading case in this area.
by the court as "an extremely close case."

Ramirez was described
817 P.2d at 784. The

Utah Supreme Court was clearly troubled by the contradictions in
the eyewitness's testimony, the cross-racial identification, and
the witness's lack of opportunity to view the gunman's face.
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Despite these concerns, the court in Ramirez deferred to the
trial court's resolution of the factual inconsistencies and its
ability to appraise demeanor evidence and upheld the
identification.

Id. at 784.

The court in this case does not stand in the same
position as the reviewing court in Ramirez because the trial
court did not review the evidence, resolve conflicts in the
evidence, make findings of fact, or make any meaningful legal
determination whatsoever.

The deference to the trial court

relied upon in Ramirez is not applicable to this case.

Absent

that reliance on the trial court's ability to assess and weigh
evidence, the court in this

case

cannot

so easily

dismiss

evidentiary problems surrounding this identification.

the

See also

State v. Perrv, 899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
As in Ramirez, the failure of the trial court to make
findings of fact in this case amounts to prejudicial error.

The

State relied heavily on the showup identification at trial.
R. 320-22.

The in-court identification was not based upon

reliable, independent observations and was tainted by the unduly
suggestive showup procedure.

There was no corroborating evidence

connecting Appellant to the crime save a highly ambiguous remark
Appellant made to the police that "Maybe Cody or Brad did
something, but I didn't do anything."

R. 345. Absent the

identification, the State has no case against Appellant.

The

failure of the trial court to make the necessary factual and
legal findings to determine the reliability of the identification
22

under the circumstances of this case warrants a reversal and
orders for a new trial.

Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 788-89.

POINT II. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT APPELLANT'S CONVICTION OF AGGRAVATED
ROBBERY.
There was insufficient evidence to establish that
Appellant intended the use of a deadly weapon in this case.
Appellant was convicted as an accomplice to Aggravated Robberypursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995) .

Section 76-6-302

requires as an element of the offense that the actor use or
threaten to use a dangerous weapon.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202

(1995) states:
Every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who
directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally
aids another person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable
as a party for such conduct.
While no Utah case has directly addressed the issue of whether an
accomplice to armed robbery must have knowledge that the
principal will use a dangerous weapon, it has long been
recognized that the defendant must specifically intend to bring
about the commission of the offense.
An accomplice is a person who knowingly,
voluntarily, and with common intent with the
principal offender, unites in the commission of
the crime. The cooperation in the crime must be
real, not merely apparent. Mere presence
combined with knowledge that a crime is about to
be committed or a mental approbation while the
will contributes nothing to the doing of the act,
will not of itself constitute one an accomplice.
State v. Fertiq, 233 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1951).
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While party

liability enables the law to hold a defendant criminally
responsible for the actions of another, "the degree of his
responsibility is determined by his own mental state in the acts
that subject him to such responsibility, not by the mental state
of the actor."

State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 534 (Utah 1983).

Federal courts that have considered this issue have held
that the accomplice must at least know that a weapon would be
carried or used.

United States v. Powell, 929 F.2d 724, 727

(C.A. D.C. 1991).

This standard puts the accomplice on the same

level of culpability as the principal.

JEd.

Requiring knowledge

that a weapon will be carried or used creates a reasonable and
fair moral divide.

If the defendant sets out on a project which

she knows involves the use of a deadly weapon, she is equally
blameworthy for its use.

Id.

Absent knowledge that a weapon

will be used, the accomplice should not be equally punished for
the principal's conduct.

See also United States v. Dinkane, 17

F.3d 1192, 1195 (9th Cir. 1994) (government must show the
defendant knew the principal had and intended to use a dangerous
weapon in order to sustain a conviction of armed robbery).
In Powell, the court held that the evidence was
insufficient to support a firearms charge on a theory of
accomplice liability where the defendant offered to sell an
undercover police officer narcotics, and took him to the basement
of an apartment where there were several other men, one of whom
was holding a gun.

929 F.2d at 725.

Likewise, in Dinkane, the

court held there was insufficient evidence to support a
24

conviction of armed robbery against the getaway driver because
the driver remained in the vehicle during the robbery, there was
no evidence that use of a gun was discussed, the driver had no
weapon, and there was no evidence that the guns used by the
principals were visible until after they entered the bank.

17

F.3d at 1197-98.
In this case, the State presented no evidence that
Appellant knew or had reason to know that the principal would use
a knife.2

The knife was not in view prior to the time the woman

told her companion to get her the shoes.
the knife secured behind his back.

R. 315.

R. 315.

The man had

There is no evidence

that it was visible prior to his pulling it out to threaten the
victim.

The woman did not use any words that would indicate that

she knew the principal had a knife.

Unlike a bank robbery, this

is not the type of crime that normally entails use of a weapon.
Also, unlike a robbery of a bank or store, this was not a planned
crime, but appeared to be a spontaneous act in response to the
victim's walking past the trio.

There is no evidence that the

2

. The following evidence was presented at trial regarding
the use of the knife. A complete recitation of all the facts can
be found in the Facts section of this brief:
1. The woman was standing with two men, and they appeared
to be together. R. 312-13.
2. She asked one of the men to get the victim's shoes for
her. R. 312-13.
3. The man approached the victim, reached behind his back,
and pulled out a knife. R. 315.
4. The man with the knife was about three feet away from
the woman. R. 315.
5. The woman and second man were about four feet from the
victim. R. 315.
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woman approached the victim with the man.

R.

315.

The woman

did not hand the knife to the principal, say anything about the
knife, or chase the victim.

R. 327-28.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the
State failed to present any evidence to support the conclusion
that Appellant knew or had any reason to know that a dangerous
weapon would be used and is thus insufficient to support a
conviction of Aggravated Robbery.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests
this Court reverse her conviction and remand with orders for a
new trial.

SUBMITTED this A<*J- day of June, 1997

REBECCA C. HYDE
~/
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

RICHARD P. MAURO
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law . . .

ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1995)
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of
committing robbery, he:
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in
Section 76-1-601;
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another;

or

(c) takes an operable motor vehicle.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a first degree felony.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act shall be considered
to be "in the course of committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate
flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202

(1995)

Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

RULE 12, UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(a) An application to the court for an order shall be by
motion.
A motion other than one made during a trial or hearing
shall be in writing unless the court otherwise permits. It shall
state with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and
shall set forth the relief sought.
It may be supported by

affidavit or by evidence.
(b) Any defense, objection or request, including request for
rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised
prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised at
least five days prior to the trial:
(1) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment
or information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the
court or to charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by
the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding;
(2) motions concerning the admissibility of evidence;
(3) requests for discovery where allowed;

9;

(4) requests for severance of charges or defendants under Rule
or
(5) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy.

(c) A motion made before trial shall be determined before
trial unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be
deferred for later determination.
Where factual issues are
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its
findings on the record.
(d) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or
at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but
the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver.
(e) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be
made of all proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such
findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally.
(f) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the
institution of the prosecution or in the indictment or information,
it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable and
specified
time pending the filing of a new indictment
or
information.
Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations.

